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AN UNCERTAIN BALANCE: STUDENT PRIVACY
RIGHTS IN A DANGEROUS WORLD
Jameson Rammell ∗

INTRODUCTION
On a warm April morning, fifteen-year-old Danny Rorhbaugh stepped
outside to eat lunch with his friends. 1 It was 11:19 a.m. at Columbine High School,
and nothing seemed out of the ordinary. By 11:21 a.m., Danny lay dead on the
sidewalk, murdered by two of his classmates. 2 Just minutes before, his attackers
entered the school with duffel bags full of guns and homemade bombs. 3 Before their
massacre finally ended, they murdered twelve of their classmates and one teacher. 4
A seemingly endless wave of questions lingered in the wake of the attack, but one in
particular loomed large: could it have been prevented?
Since Columbine, schools throughout the country have implemented
various policies and procedures designed to prevent this type of tragedy from
reoccurring. 5 Unfortunately, such attacks seem more common than ever. Between
1999 and 2018, the United States averaged ten school shootings per year. 6 While
these attacks varied in terms of motivation and severity, each involved a shooting on
school property “immediately before, during or just after classes.” 7 There were
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5. See infra Part II.
6. Some sources have less restrictive criteria, and therefore claim school shootings are more
prevalent than this number suggests. However, the cited source narrows its parameters to “only incidents
that happened immediately before, during or just after classes. . . . Shootings at after-hours events,
accidental discharges that caused no injuries . . . , and suicides that occurred privately or didn’t pose a
threat to other children were excluded, though many of these can be deeply disturbing. Gunfire at colleges
and universities, which affect young adults rather than children, also were excluded.” John Woodrow
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7. Id.
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eleven school shootings in the first three months of 2018 alone, including the
Parkland, Florida shooting, in which seventeen people were killed. 8
Naturally, this wave of school violence has pushed the topics of gun
violence and school safety to the forefront of the national conversation. 9 Student
activists are calling for more comprehensive gun control measures, 10 and on March
23, 2018, President Donald Trump signed a new spending bill that allocates $1.2
billion toward funding “physical school security measures, school police, and
programs that train teachers and students to recognize and respond to concerns of
violence.” 11
While increasing student safety and deterring violence are worthy goals,
protecting student privacy rights must not be forgotten. This article examines those
rights and considers the future of school security. It proceeds in three parts: Part I
discusses the Fourth Amendment; how it has been applied to students; and where
uncertainty still exists. Part II analyzes policies and procedures that require all
students to submit to mandatory, suspicionless searches to determine whether such
policies violate the Fourth Amendment; and Part III concludes that while the nation’s
increase in school violence may justify more intrusive and stringent security
measures, individual suspicion should still be required to justify searches that go
beyond quick scans by a metal detector or a brief glance at a student’s personal
belongings.
PART I: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The Fourth Amendment states, in part: “The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated. . . . “ 12 In the American legal system, “[n]o right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded” than this. 13 However, the
Constitution does not prohibit all searches and seizures. 14 It merely prohibits those
that are unreasonable. 15 As such, when a warrantless search or seizure is challenged,
courts conduct a balancing test to determine whether the government’s conduct was
reasonable. 16 The citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the manner in which those

8. Id.
9. See Alvin Chang, Teenagers Are Doing the Impossible: Keeping America’s Attention on Guns,
VOX,
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/21/17033308/florida-shooting-media-guncontrol [https://perma.cc/8RDK-TNWT] (last updated Feb. 22, 2018).
10. Id.
11. Evie Blad, Federal School Safety Research Eliminated to Fund New School Security Measures,
WEEK
(Mar.
27,
2018,
5:14
PM),
EDUC.
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/rulesforengagement/2018/03/federal_school_safety_research_eliminate
d_to_fund_new_school_security_measures.html [https://perma.cc/9KSB-XXCH].
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
14. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (“It must always be remembered that what
the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222.
16. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
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rights were intruded upon, is balanced against “the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” 17
Generally, searches and seizures conducted in the absence of a valid warrant
based upon probable cause are per se unreasonable. 18 However, exceptions to this
rule arise when “special needs” exist that “make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable.” 19 The Supreme Court has found such “special needs”
exist in public schools. 20 This is primarily due to the unique relationship between
schools and their students.
Schools are tasked with providing students with a safe and productive
learning environment. 21 The Supreme Court has found that requiring a warrant or
probable cause “would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and
informal disciplinary procedures [that are] needed” to fulfill this duty. 22
Additionally, most students are under the age of eighteen and subject to the control
of their parents or guardians. 23 As such, they “lack some of the most fundamental
rights of self-determination.” 24 Common law has long embraced the notion that
teachers and administrators stand in loco parentis over the children entrusted to them
at school. 25 In other words, while students are at school, school officials stand in
place of their parents. 26 This does not, however, extend all parental powers to school
officials. Rather, it extends certain “custodial and tutelary” powers, which permit
school officials to supervise students, and exercise a degree of control over them. 27
Thus, while students may have diminished rights, they do not lack all rights. 28
i.

Relevant Cases

Student privacy rights have been addressed by a number of Supreme Court
decisions. While many of the general principles have been synthesized above, a
closer examination of a few specific cases helps clarify what the reasonableness
standard requires in a public-school setting.

17. Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
18. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
19. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
20. Id.
21. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353 (1985) (“Education ‘is perhaps the most important
function’ of government and government has a heightened obligation to safeguard students whom it
compels to attend school.” (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954))).
22. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 653 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340).
23. See id. at 654.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 65455.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 656.
28. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”).
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Searches Based on Individualized Suspicion

In New Jersey v. T.L.O., two freshman students were accused of smoking
in a school bathroom. 29 While one of the students admitted to the allegations, the
other, referred to as T.L.O., denied any wrongdoing. 30 The principal took T.L.O. to
his office and demanded to see her purse. 31 Upon opening the purse, he found a pack
of cigarettes and noticed rolling papers that he believed were intended for marijuana
use. 32 Based upon these findings, he proceeded with a more thorough search which
revealed additional contraband. 33 The evidence was turned over to the police, and
T.L.O. was charged with delinquency. 34
At trial, T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
principal’s search of her purse, claiming it violated her Fourth Amendment rights. 35
The trial court denied her motion, and T.L.O. was found guilty. 36 The Supreme Court
eventually granted certiorari to address T.L.O.’s Fourth Amendment claim. 37 The
Court first held that the Fourth Amendment applies to school officials, 38 and rejected
the state’s argument that students have “virtually no legitimate expectation of
privacy” in the personal property they take to school. 39 It explained that although it
took notice of the “difficulty of maintaining discipline in the public schools today,
the situation is not so dire that students . . . may claim no legitimate expectations of
privacy.” 40
However, the Supreme Court concluded that when balancing the privacy
interests of schoolchildren against the school’s substantial need of maintaining order,
it was apparent that both the warrant and probable cause requirements were unduly
restrictive. 41 As such, a less demanding standard was established for school searches
to be considered reasonable. Specifically, the Court stated that “[u]nder ordinary
circumstances, a search of a student . . . will be justified . . . when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the
student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.” 42 In a
later case, the Court would further clarify that this “lesser standard for school
searches could as readily be described as a moderate chance of finding evidence of
wrongdoing.” 43 After applying this less demanding standard, the T.L.O. Court found
that the principal’s search was justified. 44

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32829.
Id. at 32930.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 338.
Id.
Id. at 340–41.
Id. at 341–42.
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009).
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343.
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The Court was careful to note, however, that the scope of a school search
must not be boundless. 45 Instead, it must be limited to measures that are “reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” 46
The proper scope of a school search was revisited twenty-four years later in
Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding. 47 There, a thirteen-year-old girl
named Savana was accused of bringing “forbidden prescription and over-the-counter
[pain relievers] to school” and distributing them to her classmates. 48 The assistant
principal called Savana into his office, where she denied any wrongdoing. 49 He then
searched Savanna’s backpack but found nothing. 50 However, the search did not stop
there. A female employee was ordered to take Savana to the nurse’s office to search
her for pills. 51 Savana was required to remove her jacket, socks, shoes, and T-shirt. 52
She was then “told to pull her bra out and to the side and shake it, and to pull out the
elastic on her underpants, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic area to some degree.
No pills were found.” 53
Although the Court considered the assistant principal’s initial suspicion to
be reasonable—thereby justifying a search of Savanna’s backpack and outer
clothing—it found the strip search far too intrusive, and a violation of Savanna’s
Fourth Amendment rights. 54 Simply put, when the Fourth Amendment balancing test
was applied, the school’s interest in searching for common pain relievers was easily
outweighed by Savanna’s interest in not being subjected to a strip search at school,
even in light of the lesser standard for school searches established in T.L.O. 55
b.

Suspicionless Searches

While T.L.O. and Safford both involved searches based upon individualized
suspicion, the Supreme Court has also addressed suspicionless searches. In Vernonia
School District v. Acton, 56 the Court reviewed a school district’s mandatory,
suspicionless drug testing policy for student athletes. 57 In analyzing this policy, the
Court applied its Fourth Amendment balancing test. 58 It found the school’s interest
in deterring student drug use to be compelling because “[s]chool years are the time
when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe.” 59
Such negative effects could disrupt the educational process—even for other students

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 342.
Id.
557 U.S. 364 (2009).
Id. at 368.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 369.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 373, 37577.
Id. at 37477. See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 34142 (1985).
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
See id. at 648.
Id. at 652–53.
Id. at 661.
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that do not use drugs. 60 These interests were compounded by the fact that the district
had a serious drug problem among their student body, and student athletes had been
identified as “leaders of the drug culture.” 61
In the Court’s view, the government’s interests outweighed the privacy
expectations of student athletes. 62 It explained that the privacy expectations of
student athletes are even less than the already reduced privacy expectations of
students generally. 63 This stems from the nature of school sports. By choosing to
participate in school athletics, students “have reason to expect intrusions upon
normal rights and privileges, including privacy.” 64 According to the Court, these
activities “are not for the bashful” and that “[t]hey require ‘suiting up’ before each
practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards.” 65 Additionally, the
nature of the deprivation of privacy was negligible. While students were required to
urinate in a container, the conditions were similar to what one would encounter in
any trip to a public restroom. 66 At most, a school official would be standing a
reasonable distance behind the student, waiting for him or her to finish his or her
task. 67
Just a few years later, the Court extended this line of reasoning to a more
far-reaching policy in Board of Education of Independent School Dist. No. 92 v.
Earls. 68 There, the Court addressed a drug testing policy similar to Vernonia School
District’s. 69 However, rather than applying just to student athletes, the policy applied
to all students engaged in “competitive extracurricular activities.” 70 This included
organizations such as the choir, the Academic Team, and Future Homemakers of
America. 71
The Court began by explaining “the Fourth Amendment imposes no
irreducible requirement of [individualized] suspicion.” 72 While individualized
suspicion is normally required, it may be unnecessary when “the Government’s need
to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is
sufficiently compelling to justify . . . conducting such searches without any measure
of individualized suspicion.” 73
The Government’s compelling interest in preventing student drug use,
coupled with the school’s responsibility to maintain “discipline, health, and safety”

60. Id. at 662.
61. Id. at 648–49.
62. See id. at 664–65.
63. Id. at 657.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 658.
67. See id.
68. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
69. See id. at 825–26.
70. Id. at 825.
71. Id. at 826.
72. Id. at 829 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561
(1976)).
73. Id. at 829 (quoting other sources).
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for its students, weighed heavily against finding a constitutional violation. 74 When
considering the students’ expectation of privacy, the Court found that, like student
athletes, students who participate in any extracurricular activity voluntarily subject
themselves to intrusions on their privacy. 75 Specifically, many of these
extracurricular groups required occasional “off-campus travel and communal
undress” and also had “their own rules and requirements . . . that do not apply to the
student body as a whole.” 76 When weighed against the school’s interests noted
above, the students’ expectations of privacy were found insufficient, and the drug
testing policy was upheld. 77
ii.

Remaining Uncertainty

It is clear that individualized suspicion is not always necessary to justify a
search. 78 However, in school settings, the Supreme Court has only applied this
reasoning to cases that involve drug testing specific groups of students, such as those
participating in extracurricular activities. 79 It is less clear when it is justified to search
any member of the student body without individualized suspicion. 80 Likewise, it is
unclear when a suspicionless search of a student’s backpack or other belongings is
proper. 81
The Eighth Circuit has most directly addressed these questions. In Doe ex
rel. Doe v. Little Rock School Dist., the court considered the constitutionality of a
school district’s practice of conducting random, suspicionless searches of students’
belongings. 82 Specifically, the school district had a practice of randomly selecting a
classroom and then ordering all of the students “to leave the room after removing
everything from their pockets and placing all of their belongings, including their
backpacks and purses, on the desks in front of them.” 83 Then, while the students
waited in the hallway, “school personnel searched the items that the students had left
behind.” 84 A class action lawsuit challenging this practice eventually reached the
Eighth Circuit.
Ultimately, the court found the searches of students’ belongings to be
“highly intrusive,” because students “often carry items of a personal or private
nature.” 85 As a result, searching students’ belongings in this manner could lead to
discomfort and embarrassment. 86 When weighed against the government’s
“generalized concerns about the existence of weapons and drugs in its schools,” the
74. Id. at 830.
75. Id. at 831–32.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 838.
78. Id. at 829 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)).
79. See Jason P. Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches of Students’ Belongings: A Legal,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 367, 391–92 (2013).
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. 380 F.3d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 2004).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 354–55.
86. See id.
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policy was struck down as unconstitutional. 87 The court added that such searches
would only be justified if “school officials had received specific information giving
them reasonable grounds to believe that the students’ safety was in jeopardy.” 88
This outcome seems both reasonable and consistent with the Supreme
Court’s precedent. However, Little Rock was decided in 2004. Since that time, school
violence has grown more prevalent, and calls for increased security measures have
grown more fervent. Until the Supreme Court specifically addresses these
unanswered questions, a shroud of uncertainty will remain.
PART II: PRIVACY OR SAFETY?
Entire books could be written about the efficacy of different school safety
proposals. Rather than delving into those arguments, this article simply asks whether
school policies that allow for mandatory, suspicionless searches of all students and
their belongings run afoul of the Constitution. To make that determination, the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment balancing test must be applied.
i.

Student Privacy Rights

As set forth above, all students have reduced expectations of privacy while
at school. 89 However, in T.L.O. the Court rejected the argument that students have
no legitimate expectations of privacy because “the situation [was] not so dire” as to
hold otherwise. 90 But does that statement still hold true today? It has been over thirty
years since T.L.O. was decided, and an argument could be made that in that timespan,
the “situation” has become so dire that students should no longer have a legitimate
expectation of privacy at school. Over the past twenty-five years, an average of ten
students have died in school shootings each year, with more recent years showing an
increase in school violence. 91
While that trend is alarming, it should also be put into perspective. In 2019,
more than fifty million students enrolled in public schools in the United States
alone. 92 While school shootings are horrific tragedies, the number of students killed
in these incidents represents a miniscule percentage of the overall student population.
If the above statistics hold true, in an average year, less than one out of every five
million students will be killed in a school shooting. By comparison, 772 teenagers in

87. Id. at 356–57.
88. Id. at 356.
89. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507–10 (1969) (“[T]he Court
has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of . . . school
officials . . . to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”).
90. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985).
91. See James Fox, School Shootings Are Not the New Normal, Despite Statistics that Stretch the
Truth,
USA
TODAY
(Feb.
20,
2018,
6:38
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/02/19/parkland-school-shootings-not-new-normaldespite-statistics-stretching-truth-fox-column/349380002/ [https://perma.cc/6PJT-S2TK] (“Since 1990,
there have been 22 shootings at elementary and secondary schools in which two or more people were
killed . . . . [F]ive of these incidents have occurred over the past five-plus years since 2013 . . . .”).
CTR.
FOR
EDUC.
STATS.,
92. Back
to
School
Statistics,
NAT’L
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372 [https://perma.cc/T7AL-ZCZR].
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the U.S. died as a result of a drug overdose in just 2015, which equates to 3.7 out of
every 100,000 teens. 93
Additionally, statistics on school violence can be misleading. For example,
Everytown for Gun Safety—an organization that began tracking school shootings in
2013—identified 405 incidents of gunfire on school grounds between 2013 and
2018, including “260 [that] occurred on the grounds of an elementary, middle, or
high school, resulting in 109 deaths and 219 injuries.” 94 Such reports paint a bleak
picture of school violence in America and are often shared in the news without
important context, such as the fact that the majority of these shootings were
“completed or attempted suicides, accidental discharges of a gun, or shootings with
not a single individual being injured. Of the remainder, the vast majority involved
either one fatality or none at all.” 95
To be sure, even a single student death is one too many, and incidents of
gunfire on school grounds should not be downplayed. At the same time, they “should
not be conflated with the most deadly but rare events.” 96 Although school shootings
seem increasingly common, and garner a great deal of attention and publicity, the
situation is not “so dire” that it now warrants the extreme step of depriving students
of any expectation of privacy.
As such, the principles established in T.L.O. and its successors should be
upheld, and a student’s expectations of privacy in his or her person and belongings—
although reduced due to status as a student—should still be considered both
legitimate and reasonable.
ii.

The Government’s Interest

The Supreme Court has specifically stated that individualized suspicion
may be unnecessary when the government’s need to discover “latent or hidden
conditions” is sufficiently compelling. 97 An argument could be made that, in light of
the increase in school violence, the government’s interest in discovering weapons
and preventing violence should now be considered sufficiently compelling to justify
suspicionless searches of any student entering a school building. At the same time,
it could also be argued that suspicionless searches of all students should only be
allowed if the school has specific reasons to believe violence may occur. These
arguments must be considered in light of a school’s duties. 98
School officials stand in loco parentis over their students. 99 While this
endows them with a certain amount of parental power and control, it also includes
the burden of ensuring student safety and providing a productive learning
93. The NIDA Blog Team, Teen Drug Use Is Down—But Teen Overdoses Are Up, NAT’L INST. ON
DRUG ABUSE FOR TEENS (May 7, 2018), https://teens.drugabuse.gov/blog/post/teen-drug-use-down-teenoverdoses-up [https://perma.cc/QU9Z-HYA7].
94. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, KEEPING OUR SCHOOLS SAFE: A PLAN TO STOP MASS SHOOTINGS AND
END GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 8 (2019), https://everytownresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/School-Safety-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKF4-JTGE].
95. Fox, supra note 91.
96. Id.
97. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002).
98. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
99. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–55 (1995).
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environment. 100 These are not responsibilities that the Supreme Court deems
insubstantial. In fact, the overarching trend exhibited by the Court suggests that,
particularly when student safety is at stake, it is more prone to expand the ability of
schools to search their students than restrict it. For example, while Vernonia only
allowed suspicionless searches of student athletes, Earls later allowed suspicionless
searches of all students engaged in “competitive extracurricular activities”—a
category that encompassed an extremely broad group of students. 101
In short, the government’s interest in protecting the safety of all
schoolchildren is extremely compelling. In T.L.O., Justice Blackmun wrote of the
“special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety
of schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself.” 102 It seems unlikely
that any court will ever find that this “special need” no longer exists. However, this
interest must be weighed against students’ legitimate expectations of privacy. Since
both sides have compelling interests, the decisive factor in this balancing test will
likely be the scope of the suggested search.
iii. The Nature of the Intrusion
Here, we must directly consider the specific searches at issue. For purposes
of this article, only metal detector scans and physical searches of bags and backpacks
will be considered. In Little Rock, the Eighth Circuit mentioned that metal detectors
tend to be minimally intrusive. 103 This conclusion seems sound. Millions of
Americans pass through metal detectors each day. 104 The task has become routine
and carries little risk of causing fear or embarrassment. 105 Additionally, metal
detectors do not specifically reveal what students are carrying in their bags or
clothing. Instead, the device simply alerts officials to the presence of certain
materials, which may then help establish individualized suspicion. 106 Many of a
student’s private possessions will not set off the alarm at all. Although this still
constitutes a search, it is largely unobtrusive. As such, the government’s compelling
interest in ensuring student safety seems sufficient to justify this search without any
degree of individualized suspicion.
Physically searching students’ bags and backpacks without any
individualized suspicion is less defensible. Having a school official rummage around
in their personal belongings could cause students a great deal of stress and
embarrassment. Students have a right to bring personal possessions to school, and a
right to keep those possessions private. 107 Allowing a school official to physically
search all bags significantly intrudes upon this privacy expectation. 108 Admittedly,
school districts have a strong and compelling interest in ensuring student safety and

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Compare Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664–65, with Earls, 536 U.S. at 825–26.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 353.
See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 355 (8th Cir. 2004).
See Nance, supra note 79, at 393.
See id. at 389, 393.
See id. at 393.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
See Nance, supra note 79, at 393–94.
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preventing weapons from entering their buildings. However, without a specific and
immediate threat to the school, even the government’s strong interest in this area
seems outweighed by student privacy interests.
That said, a search of bags and belonging that is more limited in scope might
pass constitutional muster. For example, merely glancing inside a backpack, rather
than rummaging around and examining all of its contents seems more reasonable. If
the scope was contained to quickly looking—rather than physically touching—areas
of the bag where a weapon such as a gun or a knife could be concealed, the
intrusiveness is diminished. Students could prepare for the search by placing private
items (that if discovered could cause embarrassment or some other harm) in smaller
pockets. Additionally, the duration of the search would likely be reduced, thereby
making it less obtrusive. Finally, if a student sought to conceal large areas of his or
her bag from view, that behavior could be used to establish individualized suspicion
for a more intrusive search.
Admittedly, there are problems with this approach. First, while it may allow
students to keep small items private (such as medication or personal hygiene
products), private items are not always small. Nor are dangerous weapons always
large. The unfortunate reality is no security measure can fully guarantee student
safety, nor can students enjoy total privacy. Instead, schools must do everything they
can to promote safety without robbing students of reasonable privacy.
Naturally, this requires compromise. Students must accept certain
intrusions and inconveniences. Perhaps private items that are too large to conceal
must be left at home. Alternatively, special arrangements could be made with school
officials that allow a student to have his or her bags searched in private. While such
arrangements do not fully protect a student’s privacy interests, they should minimize
the level of exposure and embarrassment a student suffers.
At the same time, schools must accept that there is no panacea for student
violence. While a limited glance inside of bags may not detect every weapon, at the
very least it makes it more difficult for weapons capable of quickly causing mass
casualties to be smuggled into school buildings.
Another problem with this approach is trusting school officials to not abuse
the process. As prior cases have demonstrated, despite compelling interests and good
intentions, some school officials err on the side of intrusiveness. It does not require
much imagination to think up various ways in which the practice of searching
students’ bags and belongings without individualized suspicion could be
impermissibly expanded and abused.
However, assuming safeguards could be implemented to properly limit the
scope of these searches to simply glancing inside students’ bags, it is not
inconceivable that such a policy could pass constitutional muster. As noted above,
such a search does not entirely deprive students of their privacy because they could
conceal essential personal items in small pockets or otherwise outside of plain view.
While this outcome would be at odds with the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Little Rock, “the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness inquiry is a sliding scale: the
more compelling the governmental interest, the more the government is justified in
conducting serious intrusions on legitimate expectations of privacy.” 109 Most would

109. State v. Williams, 521 S.W.3d 689, 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
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agree that suspicionless searches of students’ belongings intrude on legitimate
expectations of privacy. Nonetheless, if rates of school violence continue to increase,
that may be an intrusion the Supreme Court is willing to permit.
PART III: CONCLUSION
Requiring all students to submit to searches of their person and belongings
may seem like an effective strategy to prevent school violence. However, these
policies present clear privacy concerns. To overcome these concerns, a physical
search of students’ belongings must be carefully limited in both scope and duration.
Requiring students to quickly pass through metal detectors presents only a slight
intrusion on student privacy. Accordingly, such searches are likely to be found
constitutional—even when no individualized suspicion exists.
Physical searches of students’ belongings (i.e., rummaging through
students’ backpacks and purses) are more problematic. Students have a right to bring
personal possessions to school, and a right to keep those possessions private. 110 As
such, searches of bags and belongings carried out without individualized suspicion,
or alternatively, without an immediate, credible threat to student safety, will likely
be struck down as unconstitutional. However, if the scope of such a search was
narrowly tailored to simply glancing inside of bags, the outcome may be different.
Current caselaw provides little support for such a conclusion, but current caselaw is
also devoid of any cases addressing a policy that is so narrowly tailored. If rates of
school violence continue to increase, the Supreme Court may be willing to permit
increased intrusions on student privacy in response.
Ultimately, a delicate balance must be struck between protecting student
privacy rights and protecting student safety. Unfortunately, the proper balance
remains uncertain. The world has undoubtedly changed since the Columbine attack.
Yet each year students are still being murdered in school—a location where they
should feel completely safe. 111 While this heartbreaking reality calls for immediate
preventative action, student privacy rights should not be cast aside in the process.

110. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
111. See generally Cox & Rich, supra note 6.

